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From society's perspective, the rules governing privileged communications such as those between a client and his or her attorney are arguably the most important doctrines in evidence law. Most evidentiary doctrines relate to the court's institutional concerns. By way of example, the best evidence and hearsay rules are largely designed to enhance the reliability of the evidence on which the trier of fact bases his or her findings. 2 The primary impact of these rules is on the in-court behavior of witnesses, attorneys, and judges.
In sharp contrast, privilege doctrines concern "extrinsic policy" 3 ; they affect the out-of-court behavior of actors such as clients and patients. Thus, "the rule governing privileges" can be justifiably viewed as the most significant evidentiary doctrine. 4 During the 1973 congressional hearings on the then proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg distinguished privilege doctrine from other evidentiary rules. In his words, [ privilege law] is the concern of the public at large. [Privileges] involve the relations between husband and wife. As the Supreme Court suggested in Griswold v. Connecticut [381 U.S. 479 (1965) ] the marital privilege constitutes the basis of the family relation and antedates even the adoption of our Constitution. They involve the relations between lawyer and client, a privilege that long antedates the adoption of our Constitution. They relate to the fundamental rights of citizens. 5 During the House deliberations on the proposed Rules, one representative remarked that "unlike most evidentiary rules, privileges protect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom." 6 Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court has handed down more decisions relating to privilege law than any other part of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
7
Of all the commentators on privilege law, the late Dean John Henry Wigmore is easily the most important. Justice Frankfurter asserted that the Dean's treatise on evidence is "without any rivalry the greatest treatise on law in the English tongue." 8 One of the twentieth century giants of American evidence law, Professor Edmund Morgan of Harvard, stated: "Not only is this . . . by far [] the best treatise on the Law of Evidence, it is also the best work ever produced on any comparable division of Anglo-American law." 9 In most areas of evidence law, though, the influence of the treatise has waned. For instance, Wigmore's treatment of expert opinion is badly outdated. Wigmore's volume devoted to opinion testimony predates both the advent of DNA typing and the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 However, in some evidentiary areas the treatise still exercises great authority.
11 Notably, privilege law is the field where the treatise continues to enjoy the greatest sway. The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence frequently cited Wigmore's treatise in the official Notes to 2004 its proposed privilege provisions. 12 During the discussion of those provisions in the congressional hearings on the proposed Federal Rules, witness after witness invoked the authority of Wigmore to justify his or her position. 13 The courts repeatedly mention the treatise as support for their reasoning in privilege cases.
14 In a late 1980s privilege decision, the Supreme Court itself asserted that Dean Wigmore's theory has long been viewed as the rationale for privileges. 15 In its two most recent privilege decisions, Jaffee v. Redmond One of the most important tenets of Wigmore's position on privileges is that a true communications privilege 18 must be "absolute" in character. Understanding the meaning of that term in this context is critical. On the one hand, Wigmore understood that at a systemic level, courts and legislatures must employ a balancing test to determine whether, as a matter of policy, to recognize a privilege for a particular social relationship such as attorney-client or psychotherapist-patient. 19 Moreover, Wigmore acknowledged that the holder of a privilege ought to be allowed to waive the privilege and that the scope of a privilege could be subject to an exception stated beforehand in clear, bright-line terms. 20 On the other hand, Wigmore adamantly insisted that if a privilege applied and there was no special exception to its scope, the opposing party should not be permitted to defeat the privilege by an ad hoc, case-specific showing of need for the privileged information. 21 Wigmore forbade the trial judge from using a balancing test to decide whether, in a given case, the opponent's need for the privileged information outweighs the policies supporting the privilege.
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Wigmore's key behavioral assumption was that without the assurance of confidentiality furnished by a formal evidentiary privilege, laypersons such as potential legal clients would not consult with or confide in consultants such as attorneys. 23 The Supreme Court echoed Wigmore in its 1981 opinion in Upjohn Co. v. United States. 24 The Upjohn Court declared that at the very time of their interaction, the participants in confidential communications "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected."
25 If the layperson cannot confidently forecast that, in the future, the law will cloak his or her revelation with a privilege, the layperson supposedly would not consult or confide. The layperson could not make such a forecast if, after the fact of the communication, a judge could override the privilege based on a showing of need. In Wigmore's mind, there ought to be relatively few privileges; but if, at a systemic level, a privilege is warranted, the privilege has to be absolute to achieve the desired behavioral effect.
The Supreme Court has not only generally adopted Dean Wigmore's approach to privilege analysis. More to the point, the Court has specifically endorsed Wigmore's insistence on absolute privileges. In Jaffee, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had recognized a psychotherapist privilege but classified it as conditional or qualified. 26 However, when the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court both recognized the privilege and categorized it as absolute in a Wigmorean sense. 27 The Court did likewise in 1998 in Swidler & Berlin. There, the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, had ruled that in criminal cases, otherwise privileged communications by a deceased client may be treated as qualified. 28 As in Jaffee, the Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin forcefully rejected the treatment of the privilege as qualified. 29 The Court classified the privilege as absolute to avoid "introduc[ing] substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application." importance of the information against client interests . . . introduces" intolerable uncertainty into the privilege's application.
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Treating privileges as absolute is undeniably comforting to the members of the professions which enjoy the privileges. Further, classifying the privilege as absolute simplifies the courts' task in administering privilege rules. However, the basic question is the validity of the behavioral assumption underlying Wigmore's insistence on absolute privileges. Is it true that but for an evidentiary privilege, the average layperson standing in a confidential relationship would not consult or confide? Simply stated, that generalization is flawed. The first part of this article outlines Dean Wigmore's theory of privileges, highlighting his argument that true privileges must be absolute. The second part of the article collects empirical studies which, to say the least, call the validity of Wigmore's assumption into question. The third part of the article points out that under American constitutional law, even purportedly absolute privileges are already qualified; given the right facts creating a compelling need for privileged information, either a criminal accused or a civil litigant can surmount a privilege claim. The fourth and final part of the article turns to comparative law. That part demonstrates that many progressive legal systems classify their evidentiary privileges as qualified seemingly with little negative impact on the flourishing legal and psychotherapy professions in those countries.
As Part I explains, Wigmore's behavioral assumption enabled him to argue that the recognition of privileges comes relatively cost free to the judicial system. Wigmore reasoned that on balance, suppressing privileged information did not impair judicial fact-finding because, but for the privilege, the evidence would not have come into existence. Consequently, Wigmore could assert that the recognition of privileges caused few, if any, miscarriages of substantive justice. However, if his behavioral assumption is in error, Wigmore may have badly understated the extent to which the recognition of absolute privileges imperils the courts' ability to dispense justice. The theses of this article are that Wigmore's behavioral assumption is erroneous and that the demands of substantive justice require a reappraisal of the treatment of communications privileges as absolute. Bentham believed that the first and foremost objective of the judicial system is to accurately ascertain the truth.
33
In assessing evidentiary rules, Bentham attached the utmost priority to the criterion of whether they promote rectitude of decision.
34
As a general proposition, he opposed exclusionary rules which block the introduction of probative evidence. In his words, " [e] vidence is the basis of justice; exclude evidence, you exclude justice." 35 In particular, with the exception of the clergy-penitent privilege and the Crown privilege for state secrets, he favored the wholesale abolition of privileges.
36
For example, Bentham savagely attacked the attorney-client privilege.
37
For his part, Wigmore was in sympathy with Bentham's rationalist premise that the main objective in adjudication is rectitude of decision. 38 However, Wigmore perceived the possibility of reconciling the objective of rectitude of decision with the recognition of privileges such as attorney-client. Wigmore attempted to effect the reconciliation in the conditions he prescribed for recognizing a communications privilege. In the most cited passage in his treatise, 39 179-90 (1996) (stating that "as long as the rule is based on its present premises and is accepted as being for its present purpose, the rule must be accepted as absolute. There can be no half-way house . . . . As Lord Taylor CJ precisely and succinctly put it, one exception and the rule itself and the purpose it serves must at once be abandoned.").
42. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2285.
Looking back upon the principle of privilege, as an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice, and keeping in view that preponderance of extrinsic policy which alone can justify the recognition of any such exception . . . four fundamental conditions are recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Only if those four conditions are present should a privilege be recognized. . . . These four conditions must serve as the foundation of policy for determining all . . . privileges, whether claimed or established.
40
Wigmore realized that few claimed privileges could pass the muster of these criteria; but he believed that if a privilege did so, the privilege had to be classified as absolute. 41 The communicating parties stood in a relationship in which confidentiality was truly "essential," and the communication " 
A. The Benefit to Society
Wigmore rationalized his position with classic utilitarian, cost/benefit analysis. The benefit in this utilitarian calculus was the promotion of important social relations in which confidentiality is "essential." 43 Wigmore concluded that confidentiality was inessential in most social relations even in some such as doctor-patient, which enjoy a formal privilege in many states. To begin with, he pointed out that the medical privilege applied to many communications about facts such as "asthma" and "broken ribs," which are "disclosable without shame."
44 Furthermore, the patient often has an overpowering motive to provide the physician with any information that the physician requests. 45 If the patient is in excruciating pain and hopes that the physician will be able to prescribe a treatment to alleviate the pain, it struck Wigmore as "ludicrous" to think that the patient needed the incentive of an evidentiary privilege to disclose information. 46 Wigmore attributed the widespread recognition of the medical privilege to the successful lobbying efforts of the medical profession. 47 In contrast, he concluded that confidentiality is essential in a few social relations such as that between a client and his or her lawyer. He supported his conclusion by quoting sweeping language in a number of famous English decisions on the attorney-client privilege. 48 He cited the language in one eighteenth century decision to the effect that if there were no privilege, "there would be an entire stop to [legal] "absolute guarantee of confidentiality."
51 If a trial judge could later order disclosure even "in limited circumstances" in which the opponent has a critical need for the privileged communications, there would be a "chilling effect" on the potential client's willingness to confer and confide. 52 The courts, including the Supreme Court, have embraced Wigmore's conclusion. According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the abolition of the attorney-client privilege would mean "an end to all confidence between the client and attorney." 53 In 1976, the year after the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States 54 asserted that the attorney-client privilege is designed to "protect[] only those disclosures-necessary to obtain informed advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege." 55 In its 1996 decision in Jaffee, Justice Stevens elaborated:
[T]he likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the [psychotherapist] privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled . . . . Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such as [plaintiff] seek access-for example, admissions . . . by a party-is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken "evidence" would therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged. 56 The Court recurred to the same theme in Swidler & Berlin. There, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "without the privilege, the client may not have made such communications in the first place."
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Wigmore and the proponents of his position thus conceive absolute privileges as a necessary incentive for the average layperson contemplating a communication with a professional confidant such as an attorney. 58 The assumption is that there is a causal relationship between the creation of the privilege and the occurrence of the desired behavior; but for the existence of the privilege, the typical person would supposedly be unwilling to engage in the behavior of consulting and confiding.
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B. The Cost to the Legal System
Positing Wigmore's behavioral assumption not only dictates the conclusion that there is much to be gained by classifying privileges as absolute; the same assumption also leads to the conclusion that there is little to be lost by doing so. 60 61 Even in the imperfect world he lived in, Wigmore believed that if the courts rigorously applied his criteria, in the vast majority of cases the privileges would suppress only statements which would not have been uttered but for the assurance of confidentiality they furnish. 62 Wigmore thought that there would be a "wash" 63 -the justice system would not be in a worse net position when the trial judge enforced the privilege to exclude evidence because in most instances, absent the privilege the evidence would never have come into existence.
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This belief has many adherents. In commenting on the privilege for spousal communications, one of the leading modern jurists, Judge Richard Posner has stated:
Even if the benefits of marital privilege are slight, the costs in valuable evidence foregone also may be slight . . . . [F] or if the privilege were abolished, and this were widely known, spouses would be much less likely to make damaging admissions to each other; In addition, most courts have adopted Wigmore's belief. In 1998, a federal district court declared that the recognition of even an absolute privilege would "result[] in little evidentiary detriment where the evidence lost would simply never come into being if the privilege did not exist." 68 The Supreme Court has repeatedly made it clear that it subscribes to this belief. As previously stated, in 1976 in Fisher, the Court indicated that attorneyclient communications "might not have been made absent the privilege."
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Two decades later in Jaffee, Justice Stevens stated that without the benefit of a privilege, "much of the desirable" psychotherapist-patient communication that could qualify as "admissions . . . by a party . . . is unlikely to come into being."
70 Two years later in Swidler & Berlin the Chief Justice explained that in the case of the enforcement of the attorney-client privilege, "the loss of evidence is more apparent than real." 71 The Chief Justice conceded that there is a seeming loss of relevant evidence when a trial judge enforces a privilege, but he added that "without the privilege, the client may not have made such communications in the first place." 72 If one accepts the premise that in these relations the average layperson would not consult or confide absent a privilege, Wigmore's cost/benefit analysis is sound. The analysis not only justifies classifying communications privileges as absolute; it virtually necessitates treating privileges in that fashion. When an assurance of confidentiality is truly "essential," these useful social interactions will not occur absent a privilege. The assumption is that the layperson would refrain from consulting unless, at the time of the communication, the layperson can confidently predict that a court will later apply the privilege to suppress testimony about the communication. The prediction becomes impossible if, at a later point in time, a trial judge could override the privilege simply because the opponent made a persuasive showing of need for the privileged information. As Wigmore saw, the only way to secure the layperson's expectation of confidentiality was to recognize privileges that could be defeated only by waiver and exceptions announced beforehand-in other words, privileges that are absolute in the technical sense.
II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING WIGMOREAN ABSOLUTISM
Wigmore's behavioral assumption is the establishment view in the American law of privileges. 73 Moreover, as Wigmore himself correctly noted, the assumption is plausible. 74 However, it can be a grave mistake to equate the plausible with the proven. In truth, the assumption is unsubstantiated. 75 There have been several empirical studies of the impact of the evidentiary privileges on the willingness of clients and patients to confide in professional consultants, and those studies do not bear out Wigmore's generalization. 76 
A. The Attorney-Client Studies
The attorney-client privilege is the privilege which the Supreme Court dealt with in Swidler & Berlin. 77 At early common law, the attorney-client privilege applied only when the client consulted the attorney during 2004 litigation. 78 However, the contemporary view gives the privilege broader scope; by virtue of that view, the privilege attaches whenever the client seeks legal advice. 79 As Professor Paschal observed during the congressional deliberations over the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, many attorneyclient consultations relate to "pre-litigation conduct."
80 Hence, the privilege can come into play when the client consults a transactional attorney to structure a business arrangement with a lifelong friend-years before it ever occurs to the client that there might be a falling out with the other businessperson and ensuing litigation. The common experience of transactional attorneys is that their clients are blooming optimists about the success of the business arrangements they contemplate entering. The client may have little concern about the chance of subsequent litigation and the prospect of compelled judicial disclosure of confidences during the litigation. The client's "focus tends to be on the 'here and now' rather than on disclosure at some indefinite future time." 81 In light of the applicability of the modern attorney-client privilege to prelitigation consultations, the findings in the following empirical studies of the attorney-client privilege are perhaps not surprising.
In 1962, Yale Law Journal published the results of one of the first studies of this subject. 82 The researchers received completed questionnaires from 108 laypersons. 83 The response to question number eight is noteworthy. In their responses to that question, one-third of the laypersons indicated that they assumed that the judge could order an attorney to reveal client confidences. 84 In other words, many were willing to consult an attorney despite their erroneous assumption that a judge had the power to override the privilege ad hoc-strongly suggesting that they would still use an attorney's services if the privilege were actually classified as qualified rather than absolute. Commenting on the study, Professor Fred Zacharias stated that cumulatively, the study's findings "support the notion that confidentiality rules have some 89 Approximately half of the laypersons indicated that they would withhold some information from attorneys if there were no legal rules shielding the confidentiality of their communications with attorneys. 90 However, the respondents' other answers appeared to indicate that they would be willing to consult and confide if there were a limited privilege protecting their communications. 91 For example, in nine hypothetical cases, forty to sixty percent of the respondents stated that they assumed that their attorneys would have discretion to disclose the communication without their permission. 92 The laypersons' responses prompted Professor Zacharias to conclude that "strict" confidentiality may be unnecessary.
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Professor Vincent Alexander conducted another study during the 1980's as part of the course of study for his Doctor of Science of Law degree.
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Although Professor Zacharias focused on natural person clients, Professor Alexander studied the corporate attorney-client privilege. He interviewed corporate executives headquartered in Manhattan. He considered New York City "an ideal site," since at the time "Manhattan contained the largest concentration in the United States of corporate headquarters with internal legal departments on the premises." 95 The executives' answers indicated that in their contacts with in-house counsel, they relied more heavily on their trust in the individual attorney rather than on any assumption about the state of evidence law. 96 The key was whether in their past dealings the attorney had created rapport 97 and proved worthy of the executive's trust. If the privilege were abolished or curtailed, the executives would likely continue to consult these counsel. 98 The modification of the privilege would probably have little or no effect on the frequency of consultation. 99 For that matter, most oral consultations would continue to be as candid as in the past. 100 The real impact would be on written communication between the executives and counsel; they would put fewer things in writing and be more circumspect in written communication.
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After reviewing his data, Professor Alexander found that in the corporate setting, the operation of the privilege is overinclusive; it applies to many communications that would be made even if there were no privilege. 102 The data strongly suggested that in the corporate context, the scope of the privilege is unduly broad. 103 The data raised the question of whether any privilege should attach to communications between business executives and their inhouse counsel. 104 The data appeared to undermine the assumption that an absolute privilege is necessary. 105 Professor Alexander concluded that it would work little damage to the free flow of corporate attorney-client communications if the privilege were converted into a qualified one, capable of being overridden in exceptional cases of compelling need.
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B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Studies
As in the case of the attorney-client privilege, there has been a small number of studies of the psychotherapy privilege, the privilege the Supreme Court addressed in Jaffee. 107 As in the case of the attorney-client privilege, the available data seems at odds with the assumption that the existence of an absolute privilege is necessary to promote psychotherapist-patient communications. 108 In his dissent in Jaffee, Justice Scalia asked rhetorically "how come psychotherapy got to be a thriving practice before the 'psychotherapist privilege' was invented?" 109 After reviewing the history of psychotherapy, Professor Ralph Slovenko, one of the most respected commentators on law and psychiatry, noted that "we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the practice of psychotherapy has grown, indeed flourished, in an environment of a non-absolute privilege." 110 In the past, the recognition of an absolute privilege was inessential to the growth of the field; and the empirical studies conducted to date indicate that the future maintenance of psychotherapy does not require such a privilege.
The Miller-Thelen study is illustrative.
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Those researchers acknowledged that there is data indicating that the "level of confidentiality has little effect on client behavior."
112 Classifying the privilege as absolute rather than qualified provides an additional increment of legal protection for the confidentiality of psychotherapy, but that additional increment may have little impact on the conduct of patients.
Donald Schmid headed another group of researchers who investigated the topic. 113 In that study, in response to a general query, sixty-seven percent of the patients stated that they would be upset by a revelation of their confidences by hospital staff members without their permission. 114 However, only thirty-three percent indicated that they would be concerned by a release 2004 of information to a court.
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That percentage is substantial enough to demonstrate that there is a measure of truth in Wigmore's assumption but it nonetheless falls short of validating the generalization that the typical patient would refrain from consulting or confiding absent a privilege. The respondents were much more concerned about out-of-court disclosures to employers and insurers. 116 Another research team included Applebaum, Kapen, Walters, Lidz, and Roth. 117 They questioned inpatients as well as outpatients. 118 In both groups, only a minority of respondents stated that they would have any "[n]egative reaction[]" to a therapist's unauthorized disclosure of confidential information to courts. 119 As in the Schmid study, the researchers discovered that patients were far more concerned about out-of-court disclosure to employers. 120 The researchers reported that "the outpatients we interviewed did not appear concerned about absolute confidentiality." 121 The data led the researchers to conclude that patients would "seek and participate in psychiatric treatment even in [the] absence" of confidentiality protection.
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Daniel Shuman was the lead investigator in a Canadian-American study. 123 In the Canadian phase of the study, "[o]nly seventeen percent" of the respondents replied that they "rely most strongly on privilege" law in deciding whether to make disclosures to their therapists; instead, they relied primarily on their assessment of the therapist's sense of professional ethics. 124 The researchers found no "statistically significant difference" between the attitudes of patients residing in provinces without a privilege and those living in provinces recognizing a privilege. 125 In the American stage of the study, eighty-six percent of the respondents stated that they relied on the therapist's 130 For that matter, the studies support the conclusions that absent a privilege, a significant minority of persons would be more guarded in their written communications and that a small minority might be altogether deterred from consulting.
However, none of the studies lends any solid support to Wigmore's generalization that without the assurance of confidentiality furnished by an evidentiary privilege, the average or typical layperson would not consult or confide. At least in these studies, the lay respondents were not as concerned about judicially compelled disclosure of confidences as Wigmore hypothesized. The world does not appear to revolve around the courtroom to the extent that Wigmore assumed. If it does not, the case for absolute evidentiary privileges is markedly weaker than Wigmore made it out to be.
III. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES RENDERING EVEN PURPORTEDLY ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGES QUALIFIED
Those who claim that communications privileges must remain absolute to maintain the vitality of relationships such as attorney psychotherapist-patient overlook the fact that, to a degree, in the United States even purportedly absolute privileges are already qualified. The privileges have been rendered qualified to an extent because criminal accused and civil litigants have a constitutional right to surmount the privilege in order to introduce critical, demonstrably reliable evidence. The American legal and psychotherapy professions are somehow surviving even though they no longer enjoy truly absolute privileges.
A. The Criminal Accused
The starting point in this constitutional line of authority is the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Washington v. Texas. 131 In that case, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of two Texas statutes providing that an accused could not call as a defense witness any person charged or previously convicted as a principal, accomplice, or accessory in the same crime. 132 The statutes rendered such persons incompetent as defense witnesses. 133 The accused, Jackie Washington, was charged with murder in a shooting. 134 Washington attempted to call Charles Fuller as a witness. 135 The defense made an offer of proof that Fuller would testify Washington had tried to prevent Fuller from shooting.
136
The rub for the defense was that Fuller had already been convicted of murder in the same shooting incident. 137 Citing the two Texas statutes, the prosecutor objected to Fuller's testimony; and the trial judge sustained the objection.
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Without the benefit of Fuller's exculpatory testimony, Washington was convicted. 139 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 140 In doing so, the Court issued two significant rulings. First, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren held that the compulsory process guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The guarantee was therefore enforceable directly against states such as Texas.
Second, and even more importantly for our present purposes, the Court held that the Texas statute violated the guarantee. 142 Texas had argued that it had not denied Washington compulsory process; it allowed him to subpoena Fuller as a witness. 143 Texas's argument struck the Chief Justice as a reductio ad absurdum.
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Chief Justice Warren asserted, " [t] he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he has no right to use." 145 Warren stated flatly that a criminal accused "has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense."
146 Elaborating, the Chief Justice explained that the express compulsory process guarantee gives a criminal accused an implied "right to put on the stand a witness who [is] physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he [has] personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense."
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Washington left many questions unanswered. One pivotal question was whether the new implied right applies only to broad, incompetency rules that completely barred persons from appearing as defense witnesses. Suppose that the jurisdiction's evidentiary rules permitted the person to take the witness stand but restricted the content of his or her testimony. Assume, for example, that the jurisdiction's hearsay rule prevented a defense witness from testifying to critical exculpatory facts. Could the defense invoke Washington to override the rule?
The McDonald was the real shooter. 151 The defense attempted to introduce the testimony of three of McDonald's acquaintances that he, McDonald, had told them that he had shot the police officer.
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The trial judge excluded the testimony for the stated reason that Mississippi followed the traditional common law doctrine that the declaration against interest hearsay exception includes only statements disserving proprietary and pecuniary interest, not penal interest.
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In reversing, the Supreme Court powerfully reaffirmed Washington. 154 Citing Washington, Justice Powell found that the trial judge's ruling violated the accused's right "to present witnesses in his own defense."
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The Court thus refused to apply the implied right only to competence rules altogether barring a witness's testimony; 156 the Court extended the reach of the right to evidentiary rules that have the more limited effect of preventing a witness from giving particular testimony.
The only remaining issue was whether ultimately, the courts would take the next step and employ the right to strike down privileges in addition to rules, such as the hearsay doctrine, primarily designed to exclude untrustworthy evidence. Two other Supreme Court decisions made that step predictable.
One decision was a much earlier case, Roviaro v. United States, handed down in 1957. 157 In that case, the Court recognized the common law governmental privilege for an informer's identity. 158 The Court justified the privilege on extrinsic social policy grounds, that is, encouraging private citizens to report crimes to the police. 159 However, Justice Burton made it clear that the privilege is conditional:
A . . . limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. Thus, when there was a grave risk that the mechanical enforcement of the privilege would cause a miscarriage of justice, the privilege had to yield. Admittedly, in Roviaro, the Court stopped short of announcing a constitutional rule. Rather, the Court reached the result in Roviaro by exercising its supervisory power over lower federal courts. 161 However, the constitutional overtones of the decision were patent, replete with references to "fundamental requirements of fairness." 162 For that reason, the lower courts have come to view the doctrine as of constitutional dimension. 163 The second decision is Davis v. Alaska. 164 That decision was published in 1974, the year after Chambers. In Davis, although the Court did not rely on the compulsory process guarantee, the Court invoked the cognate Sixth Amendment right, confrontation. 165 There, the star prosecution witness was Richard Green. 166 To show Green's bias, the defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the witness about his juvenile court probationary status. 167 The trial judge had granted a protective order, barring the defense counsel from eliciting that fact. 168 The trial judge's order was based on a state statute and court rule making juvenile court proceedings confidential. 169 Functionally, the statute and court rule created absolute privileges; they barred the admission of logically relevant evidence to foster an extrinsic social policy, the "rehabilitative goals of the juvenile correctional procedures." 170 The Court acknowledged that the pursuit of that goal is a legitimate government policy. 171 Nevertheless, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause entitled the accused to present the excluded evidence to the jury; the accused's need for the evidence outweighed the extrinsic policies underlying the statute and court rule.
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The lessons from these Supreme Court decisions have not been lost on the lower courts. There is a large body of case law invoking the Sixth Amendment to permit an accused to surmount absolute privileges which threatened to prevent the accused from introducing critical, demonstrably reliable evidence. For example, the courts have ruled that the attorneyclient 173 and psychotherapist-patient 174 privileges yield when the accused establishes an exceptionally strong need for the privileged information. In similar fact situations, in which the accused had an acute need for the information, the courts have overridden the marriage counselor-client, 175 physician-patient, 176 rape counselor, 177 and spousal 178 privileges. In some cases the privilege overridden was legislative in character 179 while in other cases the privilege was a creature of case law. The common denominator was that in all these cases, the privilege purported or had been construed to be absolute. Nevertheless, in an extreme case in which the accused desperately needed the privileged information to establish his or her innocence, the implied Sixth Amendment right trumped the privilege. 
B. Civil Litigants
All the cases discussed in subpart A invoke the Sixth Amendment. By its terms, that amendment applies only "in . . . criminal prosecutions . . . ."
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Until recently, it had not been suggested, much less held, that civil litigants enjoy a parallel constitutional right to surmount privileges which would block their access to critical information.
The Argument from Policy
However, in principle, a strong case can be made that a parallel right exists under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of procedural due process.
181 By virtue of those guarantees, the government may not deprive citizens of property interests without affording them due process of law. Civil judicial proceedings unquestionably constitute government action. 182 Moreover, civil judgments can result in the deprivation of property rights. For purposes of due process analysis, the concept of property includes myriad forms of property, including a legal cause of action. 183 The issue is whether the right to present evidence is one of the procedures constitutionally "due" citizens in civil actions.
The justices of the Supreme Court differ over the proper approach to determining the procedures that are "due" or mandated constitutionally in civil cases. 184 The majority of the justices subscribe to an instrumental conception of the procedural due process guarantee 185 -as a means to an end. The end is enhancing the accuracy of fact-finding in civil proceedings. 186 a]dversary theory holds that if a party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process and feels that he has been given a fair opportunity to present his case, he is likely to accept the results whether favorable or not").
193. See id. at 20.
Chief Justice Burger once wrote, the mission of the procedural due process guarantee "is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." 187 Through its legislatures and courts, society makes policy choices embodied in substantive rules of law. Affording participants in civil cases the incidents of procedural due process helps ensure that those choices are enforced accurately.
188
A minority of the justices, though, advocate an intrinsic conception of procedural due process. 189 In their view, the active participation of citizens in civil proceedings is more than a mere means to the end of accurate factfinding; participation itself has intrinsic value. 190 In a democratic society, citizens should participate actively in civil proceedings that impact their interests. Citizen participation affirms an individual's dignity as a human being 191 and enables individuals personally to assert their rights.
192
Participation allows the individual to exercise some control over the government proceeding-a control that was prized under the individualistic philosophy dominant in eighteenth and nineteenth century England.
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Under either approach, the right to present evidence ought to be held to be an essential element of procedural due process in civil actions. Under the instrumental approach, the essential question is whether the proposed procedure will materially advance the accuracy of fact-finding. Recognition of the right to present evidence would certainly do so. The opportunity to present evidence is the most basic means available to a party to prevent the trier of fact from committing factual errors. If a party fears the trier will make an erroneous finding, the party presents evidence contradicting that finding. Further, one party's right to present evidence creates a disincentive for the other party to offer misleading evidence. The latter party realizes that even if the judge admits the misleading evidence, the former party can introduce contradictory evidence that not only will specifically rebut the misleading evidence, but generally lower the latter party's credibility in the trier's mind.
The right to present evidence should also be deemed an essential element of procedural due process under the intrinsic approach. It is an axiom of procedural due process that as a person possessed of human dignity, a citizen has a right to be heard 194 before a governmental tribunal deprives that person of a property right. That right is meaningless unless, in the first instance, the citizen has a right to speak actively to the tribunal. The indignity of inquisitorial procedure is that the citizen must stand by passively and silently while a tribunal makes a decision determining the citizen's fate or fortune. At the most basic level, adjudicatory proceedings conducted by judicial tribunals are evidentiary hearings. 195 If the citizen has any meaningful right to speak actively to the tribunal and participate in the tribunal's hearing, that right must subsume the opportunity to present evidence. There are many cases holding that, with rare exceptions, 196 citizens in administrative hearings have a due process right to present evidence. 197 If respect for human dignity requires recognition of a constitutional right to present evidence in informal administrative settings, a fortiori, citizens must be granted the same right in civil judicial proceedings.
The Argument from Precedent
Although the theoretical case for recognizing the constitutional right in civil suits is strong, until recently there was no precedent squarely endorsing the theory. However, there are now cases holding that there is a constitutional right to present evidence in civil actions and, more to the point, a right that can be invoked to override absolute privileges.
The seminal holding is the Kansas Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Adams v. St. Francis Regional Medical Center. 198 There, the plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of the defendant hospital's employees caused their daughter's death. 199 They contended that a nurse negligently failed to recognize the seriousness of their daughter's condition and neglected to alert a physician to her need for immediate attention.
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The incident was investigated by the Kansas State Board of Nursing.
201
The hospital prepared some documents and submitted them to the board.
202
The board generated other documents, and still other documents reflected investigations of earlier, similar alleged acts of incompetence by the nurse.
203
During discovery, the defendant sought protective orders to preclude the plaintiffs from inspecting the documents. 204 The lower court granted the orders because it concluded that the documents were protected by the Kansas statutory medical peer review privilege.
205
The plaintiffs filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the statute as applied, but the lower court denied the motion. 206 Eventually, the plaintiffs appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court. 207 The court agreed with the trial judge that several of the documents were cloaked by the statutory privilege. 208 The court concluded that five key documents sought by the plaintiffs "are protected by a literal reading of the peer review privilege set out in K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 69-4915 (b) and (d) . . . ." 209 However, the court then addressed the question of whether, as applied, the statutory privilege was constitutional. The court found a constitutional violation.
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The court cited a number of federal and state precedents suggesting the existence of a constitutional right to present evidence in civil cases. 211 The court then declared that at least when "[t]he information sought" goes "to the 'heart' of the case," "the substantive interest in preserving the confidentiality of information 'must give way to assure that all the facts will be available for a fair determination of the issues . . . . '" 212 In 2000, the Mississippi Supreme Court issued a decision similarly recognizing the constitutional right in Baptist Memorial Hospital-Union 213 In Johnson, the plaintiff mother gave birth to her child at the defendant hospital. 214 A nurse on the defendant's staff negligently delivered the child to another woman for nursing. 215 The latter women breastfed the child. 216 When the plaintiff subsequently discovered the mixup, she sued the hospital for negligence. 217 In order to determine whether the breastfeeding might imperil her child's health, she sought to discover the other woman's identity and medical records. 218 The hospital objected, claiming the state statutory physician-patient privilege on behalf of the unidentified patient.
219
On the preliminary issues in the case, the hospital prevailed. For instance, the court ruled that the hospital could assert the privilege on the unidentified patient's behalf. 220 Furthermore, the court concluded that the state medical privilege was so broad that it applied to both the patient's identity and the information contained in her medical records. 221 However, the court next pointed to an earlier line of criminal cases holding that the "public policy" implicated in "investigat[ing] and solving . . . crimes" sometimes outweighs the privacy rights underpinning evidentiary privileges. 222 Those cases announced that when information is "crucial" in a prosecution, it cannot be suppressed even "under the guise of the physicianpatient privilege." 223 The defendant hospital urged the court to limit the line of authority to criminal cases. But, the court refused to do so. The court reasoned that just as there is a "compelling" public interest in accurately determining the guilt or innocence of accused, the public interests at stake in a civil case can be weighty enough to override an absolute privilege. 224 The court remarked that "[t]his especially holds true when the health and life of another are potentially at stake." 225 The court thus made it clear that given the 227 In that case, there was considerable evidence that the excluded evidence, McDonald's admissions to his acquaintances, was reliable: he made the statement to friends rather than police officers, he made three separate statements, and there was corroboration that McDonald owned the type of pistol used to kill the police officer. 228 If Chambers is the benchmark, the right will rarely come into play. Moreover, the recognition of the due process right in civil cases is a quite recent phenomenon.
If the only available data were the American experience, the counterargument might be persuasive. However, this part of the article demonstrates that the experience of the judicial systems in many progressive, modern countries also points to the conclusion that privileges may be classified as conditional or qualified without crippling the various professions recognizing a duty of confidentiality.
A. Civil Law Jurisdictions
Many civil law systems categorize certain privileges as qualified. By way of example, in Denmark a judge may order a doctor or advokat to disclose confidential information when the information is of vital importance to the outcome of a case. 229 Furthermore, although Swedish law generally treats a person's private notes as privileged, the judge may compel their production if their disclosure is "extraordinarily important" to the correct disposition of ( "To hold that the court is never justified in undertaking a balancing exercise to compare the public interest in the lawyer/client privilege with the public interest in, for example, the liberty of an individual, seems unnecessarily wide and an approach that may well be regretted in hindsight. . . .
[I]t seems bizarre to state that legal professional privilege must in all circumstances outweigh the injury that the litigation. 230 Likewise, in Germany a member of the clergy may reveal otherwise privileged information if the revelation would serve a higher moral duty. 231 For that matter, the catchall professional privilege recognized in Germany yields when the disclosure could promote a more important social interest.
232 German law has also created a privilege for banking information, but in cases of necessity that privilege can be surmounted.
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B. Common Law Jurisdictions
There is even a trend toward the qualification of privileges in the common law world where Dean Wigmore's paradigm has been most influential.
England
England not only gave birth to common law privilege doctrine; England has also been bastion of the absolutist tradition in privilege doctrine. Yet, in 1972, R. v. Barton 234 announced that it was inconceivable "that our law would permit a[n English] solicitor . . . to screen from a jury information which, if disclosed to the jury, would perhaps enable a man either to establish his innocence or to resist an allegation made by the Crown." 235 It is true that in 1996 in R. v. Derby Magistrates' Court, ex parte B, the House of Lords adopted the contrary view. 236 However, that decision has been sharply criticized by numerous commentators, 237 and there have been calls for Parliament to overrule the decision and declare that even purportedly absolute privileges must yield in extreme cases. 238 Ultimately, though, it may prove unnecessary for Parliament to intervene. Even before Derby Magistrates' Court, there was English authority that the legal professional privilege (roughly corresponding to American attorneyclient privilege) can yield in a child custody proceeding when the privileged information is materially relevant to a critical issue in the proceeding. 239 According to these authorities, the privilege should no longer be treated as absolute and may be overridden ad hoc when the material in question is highly "relevant to the determination of the case . . . ." 240 Significantly, in Re L, 241 a decision postdating Derby Magistrates' Court, 242 a "somewhat differently constituted House of Lords" reaffirmed that the legal professional privilege is not absolute in child care proceedings. 243 Thus, there is reason to believe that the absolutist approach of Derby Magistrates' Court will be short-lived. 244 
Australia
A shift away from absolutism is under way in Australia. As in England, there is authority that the paramount interests of a child can surmount the legal professional privilege. In one case, a mother allegedly hid her child in violation of a court order. 245 The court ordered the mother's attorney to disclose the child's whereabouts even though the attorney's knowledge of the whereabouts was based on confidential communications from the mother. 246 Furthermore, although the state of the law with respect to an accused's ability to surmount the legal professional privilege might be in flux in England, in Australia, it is well-settled that an accused may do so. Early Australian case law 247 followed the view of the Barton decision 248 that the privilege ought to yield when the privileged information will establish the accused's innocence. 249 Then, as in England, the High Court did an about face in a 1995 decision, Carter v. Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davy & Leake.
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Carter held that legal professional privilege is absolute. 251 However, it is an understatement to say that this absolutist approach was "short-lived" in Australia. 252 Like Derby Magistrates' Court, Carter was subjected to harsh criticism. 253 In 1995, the very same year Carter was decided, a provision enacted in the Australian Evidence Act overturned Carter.
254 By the terms of that provision, even an otherwise proper claim of legal professional privilege cannot prevent a defendant from adducing evidence relevant to showing his or her innocence. 255 Possibly based upon this reasoning, the commission's draft purported to create only a conditional or qualified privilege. The draft was designed to grant the trial judge more flexibility in accommodating the conflicting interests. 260 In assessing the probative needs of the party seeking to introduce the evidence, under the draft, the judge could consider such factors as the importance of the issue the evidence relates to, the relevance of the evidence to that issue, and the availability of alternative, unprivileged information.
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Although that legislation was not enacted, since that proposal, in several decisions the Canadian courts have adopted the same approach as the legislative proposal. 262 The courts have recognized several so-called "case by case" privileges 263 -for instance, patient-psychiatrist 264 and journalistsource. 265 Unlike the more traditional "class" or categorical privileges such as legal professional privilege, "case by case" privileges can be overcome ad hoc by a showing of compelling need for the privileged information. 266 In evaluating the extent of the need, the Canadian courts consider a set of factors including the probative value of the privileged information. 
Ireland
Finally, although there is relatively little privilege case law in Ireland, there are indications that Ireland may follow suit and move toward the treatment of more privileges as conditional or qualified. It has long been established that in the case of claims of public interest immunity (the
